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Feminist Phenomenology, Pregnancy and 
Transcendental Subjectivity 
Stella Sandford 
In 1930, in the Fourth of his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl famously wrote 
that “phenomenology is eo ipso ‘transcendental idealism,’ though in a fun-
damentally and essentially new sense.” The central difference between this 
and what he calls “Kantian idealism” is phenomenology’s refusal to coun-
tenance the possibility of a world of things in themselves, not even as a 
limiting concept. What phenomenology primarily owes to Kantian trans-
cendental idealism is, of course, the idea of transcendental subjectivity. As 
Husserl wrote then, phenomenology is: 
a transcendental idealism that is nothing more than a consequentially executed 
self-explication in the form of an egological science, an explication of my ego as 
subject of every possible cognition, and indeed with respect to every sense of 
what exists, wherewith the latter might be able to have a sense for me, the ego.  
In transcendental-phenomenological theory, according to Husserl, “every 
sort of existent itself, real or ideal, becomes understandable as a ‘product’ of 
transcendental subjectivity, a product constituted in just that performance.”1 
At first glance, this appears so inimical to the fundamental bases of 
feminist theory that the question of the very possibility of a “feminist 
phenomenology” immediately and inevitably arises. This is not only 
because feminist theory is explicitly tied to a political agenda for social 
change and therefore requires the staking out of positions and commit-
ments rather than their bracketing; it is also because so much associated 
 
1 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 
1960), 85, 86. 
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with the contributions of feminist theory to philosophy concern precisely 
the critique of the transcendental, isolated, disembodied subject. However, 
other writings by Husserl—on intersubjectivity, for example—along with 
the move away from strictly static transcendental phenomenology to its 
genetic, generative, existential and hermeneutic variants in particular have 
provided methods and concepts for the development of feminist phenom-
enology, the distinguishing features of which are its challenge to the presup-
position of the sexless transcendental subject and its attempt to bring to 
light the specifically sexed aspects of experience, to “answer fundamental 
questions concerning the meaning of sexual difference, the gendered body, 
and equality in difference.”2 
Nevertheless, some feminists, such as Linda Fisher, have argued that 
even the original project of phenomenology, in its classic forms, is not 
incompatible with feminism. According to Fisher, the tasks of describing 
the essential structures of subjectivity from the perspective of individual 
subjectivity and ownness, of eidetic or essential analysis, can all be under-
stood in ways that not only do not conflict with the basic tenets of feminist 
theory but in fact chime with them.3 Indeed, feminist perspectives in 
phenomenology open up new regions of analysis—for example, pregnancy 
and birth. For others, like Johanna Oksala, feminist analysis poses a much 
greater challenge to phenomenology as originally conceived, because the 
phenomena of pregnancy and birth force a radical rethinking of ‘such 
fundamental phenomenological questions as the possibility of a purely 
eidetic phenomenology and the limits of egological self-constitution.’4 For 
Oksala, a feminist phenomenology is by no means impossible, but it is 
critical of aspects of the original project of phenomenology, destabilizing 
phenomenology as part of a permanent process of its transformation.5 
Of course, phenomenology in the twenty-first century, feminist or 
otherwise, is not tied to Husserl’s original conceptions of method, of ego-
logy, or even of the generative phenomenology that some have extrapolated 
and developed from a different Husserl. For many, the horizon of the 
 
2 Sara Heinämaa and Lanei Rodemeyer, “Introduction,” Continental Philosophy Review 
Special issue on Feminist Phenomenologies, 43: 1–11 (2010): 6. 
3 Linda Fisher, “Phenomenology and Feminism: Perspectives on Their Relation,” 
Feminist Phenomenology, eds. Linda Fisher and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
2000), 28–9. 
4 Johanna Oksala, “What is Feminist Phenomenology? Thinking Birth Philosophically,” 
Radical Philosophy 126: 16–22, (2004), 17. 
5 Oksala, “What is Feminist Phenomenology?,” 17, 21. 
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transcendental in phenomenology is now intersubjective, historical, social 
and normative, and the original feminist critique of the individualist and 
subjectivist—even solipsist—nature of phenomenology no longer holds.6 
But as phenomenology has developed and transformed itself we are still 
entitled to ask what makes it phenomenology? What are the presuppositions 
of any feminist phenomenology if it is still to count as phenomenology, 
rather than descriptive social-psychology, feminist metaphysics or feminist 
ethics? Is phenomenology essentially tied to first-person description, or can 
third-person accounts be a legitimate part of its analyses? If third-person 
descriptions are accepted as legitimate, what considerations govern the 
inevitable interpretative aspect of their analysis? Can there be any pheno-
menology, feminist or otherwise, without some conception of transcen-
dental subjectivity? And what is at stake in the continued use of the tran-
scendental problematic, granted its immanent phenomenological criticism 
and its various theoretical transformations? 
Some of these questions arise with a particular piquancy today because 
of the enthusiastic use of what are referred to as “phenomenological 
research methods” in a range of disciplines and professional practices—
notably, for the purposes of this essay, health care and nursing—and reflec-
tions upon them. Researchers in these practice disciplines who use pheno-
menological research methodologies are engaged in empirical studies 
involving data gathering and analysis. While their analyses might in some 
way be based—often at several steps removed—in phenomenological philo-
sophies, from wherever one stands within the heterogeneous discipline of 
philosophy it is clear that they are neither doing philosophy nor claiming to 
do so. Further, the non-philosophical status of these analyses has been used 
precisely to defend their description as “phenomenological” against the 
charge that they bear little or no relation to the philosophies from which 
they claim to derive their methods. That is, the charge that they are not 
really “phenomenological” because they are remote from philosophy is 
countered with the argument that this is to confuse philosophical phenom-
enology (as developed and practiced by Husserl, for example) with scientific 
phenomenology (the application of insights from philosophical phenom-
enology in the social sciences). 
The feminist phenomenology with which this essay is concerned is 
distinguished from the use of phenomenological research methods in 
 
6 See Heinämaa and Rodemeyer, “Introduction,” 1. 
 
STELLA SANDFORD 
 54
practice disciplines precisely because it is philosophical phenomenology, 
because it does conceive of itself, mutatis mutandis, as part of the tradition 
of philosophy developed and practised by Husserl. This means that the 
question “what is phenomenological about feminist phenomenology?” must 
be a question about its relation to this tradition, about its philosophical 
specificity. In what follows I will address the question of the philosophical 
specificity of feminist phenomenology by pursuing its distinction from the 
use of phenomenological research methods in practice disciplines and 
qualitative psychology via two of the pivotal questions raised above: can 
there be any phenomenology, feminist or otherwise, without some con-
ception of transcendental subjectivity? And what is the role of third person 
testimony in phenomenology? I will argue that the first of these questions 
remains a problem for feminist phenomenology, in a way that is not easily 
solved with recourse to third-person testimony, the use of which remains 
under-theorized in the feminist phenomenological literature. Finally, I will 
show how the problem of transcendental subjectivity is particularly acute 
for the feminist phenomenology of pregnancy and birth when we consider 
the generative metaphorics of its philosophical origin in Kant’s philosophy. 
Phenomenology and the third person 
Let us begin with an analysis of what is still the best-known essay in feminist 
phenomenology of pregnancy, Iris Marion Young’s “Pregnant Embodi-
ment: Subjectivity and Alienation,” first published in 1983. What, we might 
ask, is specifically phenomenological in Young’s essay? 
Young’s essay evokes (albeit only implicitly) the major distinction that 
structures Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. Beauvoir begins Volume I 
of The Second Sex with a discussion of objectifying discourses about 
women, before moving on to the lived experience of women in Volume II. 
Young reverses the direction while retaining the distinction, beginning with 
“some of the experiences of pregnancy from the pregnant subject’s view-
point”7 before considering the alienated experience of pregnancy and 
birthing which results from the objectification or appropriation of the 
woman’s body in institutionalised medical contexts. In the first part, Young 
 
7 Iris Marion Young, On Female Body Experience: “Throwing Like A Girl” and Other 
Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 46.  
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specifies two sorts of sources for material “from the pregnant subject’s view-
point” to “let women speak in their own voices”: diary entries and literature 
and “phenomenological reflection on the pregnant experience.” After 
referring critically to the (classic) presumption in some phenomenological 
literature of the unity of the subject, she cites Merleau-Ponty and refers to 
various others as problematizers of this assumption, thus setting the the-
oretical context for the discussion of pregnancy. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, the move to the phenomenological description of 
pregnant embodiment is presented, explicitly, as confirming the theoretical 
postulate of the split subject that Young associates here primarily with Julia 
Kristeva.8 But the abruptness of the leap into phenomenological description 
in the essay, which seems to be employed as a formal device, severs the 
theoretical and phenomenological modes from each other. The specificity 
of the phenomenological description is marked through the shift to the first 
person:  
As my pregnancy begins, I experience it as a change in my body, I become 
different to what I have been. My nipples become reddened and tender, my belly 
swells into a pear. I feel this elastic around my waist, itching, this round, hard 
middle replacing the doughy belly with which I still identify. Then I feel a little 
tickle, a little gurgle in my belly, it is my feeling, my insides, and it feels some-
what like a gas bubble, but it is not, it is different, in another place, belonging to 
another, another than is nevertheless my body.9 
Young goes on to emphasise the private nature of the experience of the 
movements of the foetus: “Only I have access to these movements from 
their origin, as it were … only I can witness this life within me ... I have a 
privileged relation to this other life.” And yet they are not her movements. 
What makes this experience unique (for, after all, all thoughts and all bodily 
feelings are to this extent private; feeling a foetus move is no different in this 
respect) is that she “feels the movements within me as mine, even though 
they are another’.”10 Although the distinction between phenomenological 
description and a theoretical construction that would be dependent on it 
 
8 See ibid., 49: “I take Kristeva’s remarks about pregnancy as a starting point … [but] we 
can confirm this notion of pregnancy as split subjectivity even outside of the psycho-
analytic framework that Kristeva uses. Reflection on the experience of pregnancy reveals 
a body subjectivity that is de-centred, myself in the mode of not being myself.” 
9 Ibid., 49. 
10 Ibid., 48, emphasis added. 
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then becomes blurred, Young speaks of “this sense of the splitting subject ... 
I experience my insides as the space of another, yet my own body.”11 This 
‘split’ is then characterised in various ways, but the central point remains 
the same. The theoretical presupposition of the unity of the subject of 
experience is undermined phenomenologically in the description of the 
pregnant subject as experiencing movement that both is and is not hers—as 
experiencing the inner space of her body as, simultaneously, an outer space 
for the foetus. 
Although, as mentioned, Young explicitly presents her first-person 
account of pregnant embodiment as a phenomenological confirmation of 
Kristeva’s theoretical postulation of pregnancy as split subjectivity, its 
phenomenological specificity must be the result of having bracketed any 
theoretical presuppositions concerning subjectivity. If we presume that the 
natural attitude tends towards the presupposition of ‘the transparent unity 
of self’, the achievement of the phenomenological description is, according 
to Young, the revelation of an alternative ‘paradigm of bodily experience’.12 
Young describes aspects of pregnant embodiment that, no doubt, are 
common to many women, for example, the failure to adapt completely to 
the changed shape and unusual protuberance of the (heavily) pregnant 
body: hence the possibility of being surprised by the feel of “this hard belly 
on my thigh”13 as she leans over to tie her shoelace. But common experi-
ences in pregnancy only become a philosophical phenomenology of preg-
nancy after a process of reflection, a reflection that must be worked through 
to achieve the status of a new paradigm for articulating bodily experience. 
Young also quotes Adrienne Rich and Ann Lewis describing their 
experiences of pregnancy in the first person, but these are not, for Young, 
part of the phenomenological reflection in her essay; rather, they are the 
second hand reports from diary entries and “literature” that complement it. 
In Young's essay the specifically phenomenological aspect of the analysis is 
limited to the first person description, and in this her work exemplifies what 
many—from within and from outside of the discipline of philosophy—still 
see as the classic practice of phenomenology, even one of its defining 
 
11 Ibid., 48,49. 
12 Ibid., 46. Young does not explain whether this alternative paradigm is the revelation of 
a primordial and essential experience of split subjectivity writ large, or whether the 
experience of pregnant embodiment is unique in this respect. But the relation to 
Kristeva’s theoretical paradigm suggests that it is the former. 
13 Ibid., 50. 
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features. Indeed, for most researchers using phenomenological research 
methods in practice disciplines and psychology—which might typically 
employ semi-structured but in-depth interviews of relatively small groups 
to gather data—the move from philosophical phenomenology to its adapted 
employment in empirical enquiry is the move from first-person to third-
person experience.14 In studies in phenomenological psychology, for 
example, the process might typically be as follows: after a process of 
selection, representatives of a particular group (usually very specifically 
defined—for example, first-time mothers who have recently given pre-
mature birth to very-low-birth-weight babies15) are interviewed, interviews 
are transcribed, commentaries on transcriptions are written, themes in 
these commentaries are identified, connection between or patterns across 
cases are found, and conclusions reached.16 And yet is it precisely the aim of 
allowing people to speak “in their own voices,” which was also Young’s aim 
in “Pregnant Embodiment,” to allow others to describe their “lived experi-
ence,” that is often taken to characterise phenomenological psychology, for 
example. As Smith, Flowers and Larkin put it, the core phenomenological 
aspect of interpretative phenomenological analysis in psychology and other 
disciplines based on third-person data entails: 
detailed examination of human lived experience. And it aims to conduct this 
examination in a way which as far as possible enables that experience to be 
 
14 Amadeo Giorgi—whose work on the formalization of phenomenological methods for 
psychology is extremely influential and among the most frequently cited in pheno-
menological work in practice disciplines—uses this criterion to distinguish between 
philosophical phenomenology and scientific phenomenology (indeed, the terminology 
of “philosophical phenomenology” and “scientific phenomenology” is his). See, for 
example, Amadeo Giorgi, “The Theory, Practice and Evaluation of the Phenomeno-
logical Method as A Qualitative Research Procedure,” Journal of Phenomenological 
Psychology 28:2 (1997): 235–261. See also, for example, Jonathan A. Smith, Paul Flowers 
and Michael Larkin, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (London: Sage, 2009), 15 
and 33: “the challenge for phenomenological psychology is to translate the insights of 
phenomenological philosophy into a practical but coherent approach to the collection 
and analysis of third-person data.” See also Amadeo Giorgi and Barbro Giorgi, “Pheno-
menology,” Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Research Methods, ed. Jonathan 
A. Smith (London: Sage, 2003). 
15 See Nehami Baum, Zilla Weidberg, Yael Osher and David Kohelet, “No Longer 
Pregnant, Not Yet a Mother: Giving Birth Prematurely to a Very-Low-Birth-Weight 
Baby,” Qualitative Health Research, 22 (2012): 595–606. 
16 This characterisation is drawn from Smith, Flowers and Larkin, Interpretative Pheno-
menological Analysis, 79 ff., which is a textbook for researchers in qualitative psychology. 
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expressed in its own terms, rather than according to predefined category 
systems.17 
Since the late 1990s the use of phenomenological research methods in 
empirical studies of practice disciplines, particularly nursing, has been sub-
ject to sustained criticism. One aspect of this criticism concerns precisely 
the use of third-person accounts as if they are incorrigible, direct accounts 
of lived experience. For unless the researcher can be confident that the 
research participants (the interviewees) have themselves already performed 
some kind of phenomenological reduction, will what they tend to report not 
be described from the perspective of the natural attitude?18 Of course the in-
depth interview, in which researchers encourage participants to reflect, and 
from which they will select only that data that seems to be the result of such 
reflection, goes some way towards addressing this. Similarly, in the use of 
complementary third-person description in Young’s essay—drawn from 
literature that is, precisely, a reflection on the experience of pregnancy—a 
degree of confidence in the testimony seems warranted. Nevertheless, this 
does give rise to questions that a rigorous philosophical phenomenology 
would be required to address. If third-person testimony is the basis for non-
philosophical phenomenological analyses in, for example, some practice 
disciplines and qualitative psychology, what, exactly, is its role in philo-
sophical phenomenology? 
Prominent critics of classical phenomenology such as Daniel Dennett 
have questioned what they presume to be the purely “subjective” nature of 
introspective first-person phenomenological accounts. Dennett’s hetero-
phenomenology (not the proposal of a new theory but a description of 
existing practice in cognitive science, the analysis of third-person data) 
avoids this because, as Dan Zahavi explains, the primary data is the reports 
of subjective experience, not the reported experiences themselves.19 But with 
 
17 Ibid., 32 
18 For an account of criticisms of phenomenological studies in nursing in particular, see 
Annelise Norlyk and Ingegerd Harder, “What Makes a Phenomenological Study Pheno-
menological? An Analysis of Peer-Reviewed Empirical Nursing Studies,” Qualitative 
Health Research 20:3 (2010): 420–431, especially 428. 
19 Dan Zahavi, “Killing the Straw Man: Dennett and Phenomenology,” Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences, 6 (2007): 21–43, 23. Dennett’s criticisms can be found in, for 
example, his Consciousness Explained, (Boston MA: Little, Brown & Co, 1991). Of 
course, there is a sense in which the “third-person” reports are also “first-person” 
reports; that is, they may be in the first person grammatically, but viewed from the per-
spective of the one who analyses them they are third-person reports. 
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the use of third-person testimony in philosophical phenomenology it is the 
reported experience, and not the report, that is being invoked as primary 
data, hence the problem becomes that of the status of the third person, not 
the first person, aspects of phenomenological analyses. How is its veracity as 
the description of lived experience to be verified? What is the relationship 
between these third person accounts and the interpreting phenomenologist? 
What are the criteria of selection of sources? What can those sources 
genuinely contribute “from themselves” if (as in Young’s essay) they are 
drafted in to confirm first person phenomenology? And is the pheno-
menologist obliged to take account of third person data that conflicts with 
their first person phenomenology? 
Researchers in practice disciplines engaged in empirical studies can 
either avoid these questions or answer them directly by beginning with 
open research questions (for example, “how do pregnant women experience 
12-week sonograms?”), explaining the selection criteria for research parti-
cipants and showing the process of identification of common topics or 
themes across cases in the analysis, perhaps even making the unedited inter-
view transcripts available for scrutiny. In all of this the first person 
experience of the researcher has no priority; indeed the research may be 
investigating experiences from which the researcher is, per impossibile, 
excluded. But philosophical phenomenologists may well have more trouble 
addressing these problems. Philosophical phenomenology is distinguished 
from the use of phenomenological methods in practice disciplines in 
attempting to move from description of phenomena or lived experience to 
the identification of what is essential to them or to the analysis of the con-
stitution of their meaning, but what is the basis for this move by the pheno-
menologist when the source material is second hand? How does the move 
from empirical third person accounts to transcendental analysis by the 
phenomenologist distinguish itself from theoretical interpretations of others 
sorts?20 What is the specifically phenomenological moment in that move? 
These questions arise in a particularly acute form for what we might call 
the “non-standard” phenomenology that engages theoretically with non-
 
20 In the use of phenomenological methods in practice disciplines the problem occurs in 
the opposite direction, as Jocalyn Lawler points out. Given that phenomenologies (she 
insists on the plural) were not intended to be employed “for field work or empirical 
inquiry” the difficulty faced by those who do so employ them is “in translocating or 
transforming philosophical systems into empirical ones for a practice discipline.” 
Jocalyn Lawler, “Phenomenologies as Research Methodologies for Nursing: From Philo-
sophy to Researching Practice,” Nursing Inquiry, 5 (1998): 104–111, 110. 
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phenomenological discourses and non-philosophical disciplines. Although 
this engagement is often the basis for the most fruitful aspects of such non-
standard—including, often, feminist—phenomenology, it also gives rise to 
specific problems for it as phenomenology. Heinämaa and Rodemeyer 
make this point in their review of the history of feminist phenomenology. 
That feminists should have forged connections between phenomenology 
and other philosophies is not, they argue, surprising: 
as phenomenology shares several central topics—experience, subjectivity, dura-
tion, and intersubjectivity—with psychoanalysis, pragmatism, and social theory. 
Methodologically, however, these developments involved problems, as they 
neglected or abandoned the distinction between transcendental or ontological 
enquiries and empirical investigations.21 
The return of the transcendental subject 
Of course, the relation between the empirical and the transcendental is itself 
one of the major issues in feminist phenomenology, addressed in several 
different ways and not primarily as a problem to be solved but as a contri-
bution to a more adequate phenomenology. One of the main achievements 
of feminist phenomenology has been, precisely, to question the assumption 
in classical phenomenology of the sexed neutrality of the transcendental 
subject, and to some extent this has meant questioning the assumption of 
the possibility of the standpoint of transcendental subjectivity cleansed of all 
traces of the empirical ego. Emphasis on the sexed specificity of embodied 
consciousness and refusal to “shy away from the idea that the reflective 
activity or practice [of phenomenology] may itself be gendered”22 are not—
as early anti-feminist phenomenologists might have claimed—the result of 
an incomplete reduction. Rather, it is the assumption of the pure tran-
scendental ego that fails to carry out the reduction to its fullest extent. As 
Alia Al-Saji writes, taking the transcendental ego to be phenomenology’s 
ultimate discovery leaves the “structures of experience that have been 
‘naturalized’ to this ego” invisible. Further, the point here is “not simply 
 
21 Heinämaa and Rodemeyer, “Introduction,” 4. 
22 Ibid., 5. 
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that the transcendental ego still carries traces of the empirical ego; it is that 
there is no ontologically prior level of subjectivity that can be so conceived.”23 
To the extent that this is a claim about the essential structure of the 
subject (an emblematically phenomenological result) we may take Young’s 
analysis of pregnant embodiment as revealing the ‘split subject’ to exemplify 
the kind of phenomenological procedure that leads to it. Young’s analysis 
also exemplifies the performative (and perhaps productive) contradiction 
that would seem to be an ineliminable element of all first person pheno-
menology, grounded in the incorrigibility of lived experience, that describes 
or otherwise propounds the idea of a split subjectivity or of the essentially 
intersubjective grounding of subjectivity. That is, in the phenomenological 
description of pregnant embodiment Young stresses the private and 
exclusive nature of her experience: “Only I have access to these movements 
from their origin, as it were. For months only I can witness this life within 
me ... I have a privileged relation to this other life.”24 Only she—this unique 
experiencing subject—can thus describe these experiences as they are for 
her, but in so far as she describes them, as part of a philosophical pheno-
menology (rather than, for example, as part of a quasi-medical report to an 
ante-natal nurse), she adopts the very position of the “unified” trans-
cendental subject that the analysis aims to problematize. 
This is not a contradiction in what is said, but a contradiction between 
what is said and the way of saying it or the position from which it is said—a 
performative contradiction. As such, one could argue, it is not a problem; 
rather, it is the difference between, on the one hand, a methodological 
necessity (the standpoint of the transcendental subject) and a philosophical 
result (the postulate of the split subject, or of the essentially intersubjective 
grounding of the subject). Heinämaa and Rodemeyer make a similar point 
in explaining the apparent contradiction between Husserl’s commitment to 
the idea of the transcendental ego and remarks about the necessarily world-
liness of any subject: that is, “the distinction between the transcendental ego 
and the empirical ego is methodological, without any ontological implica-
tions … the transcendental ego is not a separate being but a reflective modi-
fication or possibility of the mundane self.”25 But granted that the tran-
scendental ego may be understood in wholly methodological terms, does it 
 
23 Alia Al-Saji, “Bodies and Sensings: On the Uses of Husserlian Phenomenology for 
Feminist Theory,” Continental Philosophy Review, 43 (2010): 13–37, 16, n. 9. 
24 Young, On Female Body Experience, 49. 
25 Heinämaa and Rodemeyer, “Introduction,” 5. 
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not nevertheless remain a methodological problem for feminist phenomeno-
logy? And could the use of third person description in feminist phenom-
enology in fact be an answer to this methodological problem? 
Johanna Oksala addresses the first of these questions explicitly in a 
critique of what she calls the “classical” position in phenomenology, spe-
cifically a critique of the possibility of its accounting for gender. Oksala 
restates the basic form of the feminist criticism of traditional phenomenology 
in claiming that the classical position, with its commitment to the idea of a 
pure transcendental ego as “universal pure subjectivity,”26 makes any feminist 
phenomenology impossible, given the oxymoron of “sexed universal pure 
subjectivity.” But Oksala also criticises the various phenomenologies commit-
ted to the fundamentally intersubjective nature or presuppositions of tran-
scendental subjectivity.27 If, she argues, intersubjectivity is understood as a 
constitutive element of subjectivity—an “apodictic structure of transcen-
dental subjectivity”—the presupposition of this  
“universal a priori structure” once again prohibits the consideration of 
that subjectivity as gendered. This problem is only avoided, according to 
Oksala, if intersubjectivity is understood, instead, as the situatedness of the 
incarnate subject in an “intersubjective, historical nexus of sense” in which 
meaning is “handed down,” such that the meanings that phenomena can have 
for me, including the meaning of my own body and gendered experiences, are 
intersubjectively constituted through learned systems of normality.28 
For Oksala it is possible to understand the constitution of specific 
gendered meanings with this conception of intersubjectivity, where it is not 
possible with the other conceptions of intersubjectivity or with the classical 
or corporeal phenomenological approaches. But how, she asks, can we 
 
26 Johanna Oksala, “A Phenomenology of Gender,” Continental Philosophy Review, 39 
(2006): 229–244, 231.  
27 Oksala is also critical of the essentialist tendencies of the Merleau-Pontian ‘corporeal’ 
phenomenology of feminists like Young and Sonja Kruks, arguing that their focus on the 
body, ‘is simply too limited a framework to support a philosophical understanding of 
gender’, which must also be able to take into account the linguistic, cultural and other-
wise normative contexts that shape the value and meaning of corporeal experiences, 
including the apparent ‘givenness’ of sex duality itself. Oksala, “A Phenomenology of 
Gender”, 233. 
28 Ibid. As Oksala explains, this does not mean that “normality” cannot be questioned. I 
learn what counts as normal; I know when I fail to live up to “normal.” The possibility 
exists of a communal challenge to “what counts as normal” on the basis of a new 
articulation of “failing” as “resisting,” for example, leading to the possibility of the 
constitution of a new normal. 
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undertake a phenomenological study of the constitutive role of inter-
subjectivity understood in this way? If intersubjectivity thus understood is 
historically and culturally conditioned, what could any phenomenology do 
with these conditions except bracket them? Oksala’s point is that pheno-
menology cannot both “acknowledge the constitutive importance of 
language and cultural normality”29 of mundane phenomena and retain the 
reduction to transcendental consciousness, as however this is understood it 
must involve bracketing those phenomena in the name of seeking a non-
subjective “essence” or structure of some kind. For, we might add, if phe-
nomenology is not seeking to do this, what is it seeking to do that distin-
guishes it from other (for example Foucauldian) ways of understanding the 
construction of gender, or from the empirical studies of the experience of 
gendered existence that use phenomenological methods? 
Oksala’s own answer to this question is that philosophical phenomeno-
logy of gender “is still understood as an investigation of the constitution of 
gendered experience, not as a conceptual analysis of language or a biological 
investigation of the body.” But in order to do this, she argues, philosophers 
must not only give up the phenomenological reduction to transcendental 
consciousness, 
We have also to give up the first-person perspective as the indispensable starting 
point of our analysis. In striving to understand the constitution of gendered 
experience it is more helpful to start by reading anthropological and sociological 
investigations, medical reports on intersexed children, or psychological studies 
of children’s gender beliefs than by analyzing one’s own normatively limited 
experiences.30 
This is not to give up on phenomenology, she claims, because these em-
pirical investigations can only reveal the constitutive structures of experi-
ences when they are submitted to critical, philosophical analysis, and this 
reflection “must ultimately take the form of radical self-reflection. It is 
ultimately I who must read these investigations, and it is only in relation to 
my experience that they can reveal something previously hidden about its 
constitution, its limits and its supposedly natural and universal character.” 
This, she says, is a form of reduction to the extent that it “makes us aware of 
the hidden aspects of our own thought … and allows us to reveal and 
 
29 Ibid., 237. 
30 Ibid., 238. 
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question its constitutive conditions.” This is not, according to Oksala, a 
move to transcendental consciousness, but to the level of transcendental 
discourse.31 But it is difficult to see how this does not, in fact, return us to 
the same problem that Oksala identifies with the idea of intersubjectivity as 
historically and normatively constituted. For granted that this does not start 
with first person experience or any conception of transcendental sub-
jectivity, it does seem to end up with them. Oksala claims that critical 
problematization of the structures of normality “is not possible without a 
first-person perspective: the subject must engage in the attentive and radical 
study of her own constitution.”32 But what is discovered in such a study is 
only philosophically interesting, and can only have transcendental signifi-
cance, if it is more than subjectively valid, if the structures revealed are 
shared structures: that is, only if the reflecting subject is understood in its 
universal aspect—as a transcendental subject. 
Parthenogenic birth 
So far I have argued that if feminist phenomenology is to retain its 
specificity—if it is to be able to distinguish itself philosophically from, for 
example, a Foucauldian account of the constitution of subjectivities, or 
from the non-philosophical use of phenomenological methods in practice 
disciplines—it needs to be methodologically committed to some conception 
of transcendental subjectivity, even in its most, as it were, benign form, as 
first-person description. And granted the possibility that a recourse to 
third-person description or (as in Oksala’s argument) empirical data might 
seem to offer an alternative to the methodological commitment to trans-
cendental subjectivity, this brings with it problems that any rigorous phe-
nomenology would be required to address concerning the philosophical 
specificity of such a phenomenology and the criteria for reliance on third-
person accounts, given what has been taken to be the essential role of the 
reduction (perhaps also of eidetic variation) in phenomenology. These are 
concerns for any feminist phenomenology. 
But if it is right that any phenomenology necessarily involves some—
perhaps implicit—conception of transcendental subjectivity this also raises 
 
31 Ibid., 238, 239. 
32 Ibid., 240. 
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a more specific concern for the feminist phenomenology of pregnancy and 
birth. This is not just because the methodological commitment implicitly 
presupposes precisely that ontological or existential commitment to the 
universality of the transcendental subject that any feminist phenomeno-
logy—in so far as it involves the elaboration of a specifically sexed experi-
ence—must deny, as Johanna Oksala argues. As the quotation from Husserl 
at the beginning of this essay reminds us, the phenomenological conception 
of transcendental subjectivity derives from, and can never fail to refer to, 
Kant. And while the phenomenological conception of transcendental 
subjectivity obviously departs from the letter of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason it is nevertheless stained through with some of its major presup-
positions, especially as concerns the constituting function of the transcen-
dental subject and its universality (in its distinction from the empirical 
subject). When the topics of pregnancy and birth are brought to phenom-
enology, every fibre of feminist phenomenology strains against this. But 
there is also evidence to suggest that a certain thinking of generation is 
already, problematically, the metaphorical or imaginary basis of the 
fundamental idea of transcendental subjectivity and the transcendental 
elements of experience. 
In the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, at the end of the 
transcendental deduction of the categories, Kant distinguishes the doctrine 
of transcendental idealism from competing theories of knowledge—or, 
more specifically, theories of the relation between concepts and 
experience—by characterising them in terms of various theories of bio-
logical generation.33 Transcendental idealism, he writes there, is “a system of 
the epigenesis of pure reason,” while empiricism is akin to generatio 
aequivoca (what we now call “spontaneous generation”). If there is a 
“middle way” between these—Cartesian innatism, perhaps—it is “a kind of 
preformation-system of pure reason.”34 Epigenesis and preformationism 
were the two main competing theories of biological generation in the 
eighteenth century. According to the various different versions of pre-
formationism, the embryo either pre-exists, fully formed, in the maternal 
 
33 The following pages draw on the longer version of this argument on the gendered 
imaginary of Kant’s transcendental idealism in Stella Sandford, “Spontaneous 
Generation: The Fantasy of the Birth of the Concepts in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,” 
Radical Philosophy 179 (2013): 15–26.  
34 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1998, B167–8, 264–5. (Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft, 1 & 2, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1956.)  
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ova or the paternal spermatozoon, or (the more common position by Kant’s 
time) preformed germs contain all the essential parts of the foetus. In either 
case biological reproduction is understood as the provocation of the 
development or unfolding of pre-existing forms or parts, not the generation 
by the parents of a new organism. The theory of epigenesis, on the other 
hand, held that each embryo was a newly generated organism—the pro-
duction of something new that had not existed before—the embryo and its 
parts developing from previously unorganised material. 
Commentators who have tried to understand the meaning of Kant’s 
characterisation of transcendental idealism as an “epigenesis of pure 
reason” have attempted to produce some accommodation between the bio-
logical theory of epigenesis and the doctrine of transcendental idealism, to 
lay out the terms of an analogy between them, with reference also to what is 
known of Kant’s commitments—and indeed contributions—to biological 
theories of generation. This generally means that commentators try to 
understand how the generation of the categories or of metaphysical know-
ledge on the basis of the categories can be understood through the theory of 
epigenesis.35 But if we put the single reference to epigenesis in the Critique 
of Pure Reason in the context of its larger set of metaphors of generation, 
birth and biological ancestry, another form of reproduction emerges as the 
dominant imaginary or metaphorical basis for understanding the specificity 
of transcendental idealism and the role of the transcendental subject in the 
generation of the categories. 
Although the first contrast in the passage containing the epigenesis 
metaphor is between transcendental idealism as epigenesis and empiricism 
as generatio aequivoca (spontaneous generation) the general tendency of the 
metaphors of generation that permeate the Critique of Pure Reason is, to the 
contrary, to characterise the production of the categories by the faculty of 
understanding as, precisely, a spontaneous generation. Contrasting the 
 
35 See, for example, Günter Zöller, “Kant on the Generation of Metaphysical Know-
ledge,” Kant: Analysen-Probleme-Kritik, eds. Hariolf Oberer und Gerhard Seel, (Würz-
burg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1988); Philip R. Sloan, “Preforming the Categories: 
Eighteenth-Century Generation Theory and the Biological Roots of Kant’s A Priori,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 40:2 (April 2002); John Zammito, “’This Inscrutable 
Principle of an Original Organization’: Epigenesis and ‘Looseness of Fit’ in Kant’s 
Philosophy of Science,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 34, 2003; John 
Zammito, “Kant’s Early Views on Epigenesis: The Role of Maupertuis,” The Problem of 
Generation in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Justin E.H. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
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faculties of sensibility and understanding in the “Introduction” to the Tran-
scendental Logic, Kant characterises the former as “the receptivity of our 
mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way,” while 
understanding is “the faculty for bringing forth representations itself 
[Vorstellungen selbst hervorzubringen], or the spontaneity of cognition.”36 
Kant frequently talks of the “origin” (Ursprung) of the categories in the 
understanding37 and says that they “spring pure and unmixed from the 
understanding [rein und unvermischt entspringen],” a fact which a little later 
requires, he says, the production of “an entirely different birth certificate 
than that of an ancestry from experiences.”38 Referring to them often as 
“ancestral concepts” (Stammbegriffe)39 Kant speaks of the need to “bring 
[them] forth [hervorzubringen]” by a special act of the understanding;40 they 
are, as the epigenesis passage itself says, “self-thought.” In the Trans-
cendental Doctrine of Method, Kant speaks of the possibility of synthetic a 
priori judgements in the same way, as “this augmentation of concepts out of 
themselves [diese Vermehrung der Begriffe aus sich selbst] and the partheno-
genesis [die Selbstgebärung], so to speak, of our understanding (together 
with reason), without impregnation by experience [ohne durch Erfahrung 
geschwängert].”41 As all of these quotations show, then, but the last shows 
most explicitly, the most insistent generative model evoked in the Critique 
of Pure Reason is in fact neither preformationism nor epigenesis but some-
thing much more like parthenogenesis, in the sense of a spontaneous pro-
duction without fertilisation or impregnation. The categories spring from 
the understanding as Athena sprang from the head of Zeus. 
Elsewhere in Kant’s work there are what appear to be imaginative 
descriptions of something like parthenogenesis. In his review of Herder’s 
 
36 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A51/B75, 193. 
37 For example, at A57/B81, 196; A62/B87, 199. 
38 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A67/B92, 204; A86/B119, 221. 
39 For example, at A13/B27, 134; A81/B107, 213. “Ancestral concepts” are contrasted 
with “derivative concepts.” 
40 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B111, 215. 
41 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A765/B793, 656. Kant’s “so to speak” (so zu sagen) 
legitimates Allen and Wood’s translation of die Selbstgebärung as “parthenogenesis” 
(when Kant does not say, for example, der Jungfernzeugung). Kemp Smith (Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1933) 
translates die Selbstgebärung as “spontaneous generation”; Helmut Müller-Sievers (Self-
Generation: Biology, Philosophy and Literature Around 1800, Stanford CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1997, 49) translates it as “self-delivery.” Note also that Vermehrung in this 
passage has as well the sense of “breeding” or “reproduction.” 
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Ideas, for example, in denying the possibility of continuity between species, 
Kant reveals a kind of horror at the idea of a parthenogenic mother. 
Granting the possibility of describing nature in terms of the hierarchical 
categorization of species according to their similarities does not, for Kant, 
mean admitting to any affinity between species: 
The smallness of the distinctions, if one places the species one after another in 
accordance with their similarities, is, given so huge a manifoldness, a necessary 
consequence of this very manifoldness. Only an affinity among them, where 
either one species would have arisen from the other and all from a single 
procreative maternal womb, would lead to ideas which, however, are so 
monstrous that reason recoils before them.42 
In the Critique of Teleological Judgment Kant notes, similarly, that the 
resemblances between various natural forms reinforces the suspicion “that 
they are actually akin, produced by a common original mother,” and that 
the “archeologist of nature,” considering this, 
can make mother earth (like a large animal, as it were) emerge from her state of 
chaos, and make her lap promptly give birth initially to creatures of a less 
purposive form, with these then giving birth to others that became better 
adapted to their place of origin and to their relations to one another, until in the 
end this womb itself rigidified, ossified, and confined itself to bearing definite 
species that would no longer degenerate, so that the diversity remained as it had 
turned out when that fertile formative force ceased to operate.43 
The awful possibility that is being contemplated—effectively, self forming 
and active matter—is imaginatively described in terms of a maternal (hence 
female) generative power, labouring apparently parthenogenically, without 
any mention of a paternal partner. 
In these passages Kant is rejecting something like the parthenogenic 
properties of matter itself, the initially unlimited fecundity and generative 
power of “a single procreative maternal womb” or “a common original 
 
42 Immanuel Kant, “Review of J.G. Herder’s Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of 
Humanity,” trans. Allan W. Wood, in Anthropology, History and Education, eds. Robert 
B. Louden and Günter Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 132. 
43 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1987), § 80, 304 and 305. This passage is sometimes mistakenly interpreted as expressing 
Kant’s own view, but Kant is not the “archeologist of nature” who thinks this; he merely 
reports the possible view of such an archaeologist. 
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mother” spilling offspring from her lap: the naturally generatively self-suf-
ficient virgin mother, matter giving birth to form. The model of partheno-
genesis appropriated for the description of the generation of the categories 
seems, on the other hand, to be more like that of the supernatural virgin birth. 
But if a supernatural parthenogenesis provides the model for the mono-
parental generation or spontaneous self-production of the categories out of 
the understanding, the generation of intellectual form itself, this is now a 
masculine parthenogenesis, if we assume—as the quotations lead us to—that 
the conventional gendering of the matter/form distinction as female/male is 
at work here. Taken together these quotations from Kant reveal the tran-
scendental subject imagined in terms of parthenogenic masculinity, spon-
taneously giving birth to form, to the principles of intelligibility, in a process 
of homo-production in the sense that the intellectual entities are born from 
the intellect itself, the same from the same. 
How can feminist phenomenology deal with its ancestral relation to this 
parthenogenic transcendental subject, so inimical to the explicit standpoint 
and to the suggestions that have come from the phenomenology of preg-
nancy and birth? How can it be sure that it is not still haunted by it? On the 
other hand, perhaps the only phenomenology capable of disrupting the 
sovereignty of the transcendental subject in its own philosophical history is, 
precisely, the phenomenology of pregnancy and birth. But in order to truly 
accomplish this disruption such a phenomenology would have to become 
fully conscious of and fully explicit about its relation to that subject and 
about its own methodological presuppositions. 
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